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Summary: This article advocates an approach to children’s participation 
in medical decision-making processes guided by the rationality of the 
best interests’ principle, a child’s evolving capacity and a child’s age. 
Using a human rights-based approach, rooted in the UN Convention 
on the Rights of the Child and the African Children’s Charter, it seeks 
to elucidate the contested three-way partnership between the child, 
its parent(s) and the assigned physician(s), which plays out in relation 
to most medical procedures involving children. In analysing legislation 
and case law, the article further aims to clarify the complex relationship 
between age and maturity in child participation; to facilitate a child’s 
involvement in the three-way partnership; and to suggest the statutory 
recognition of an age indicator in domestic African law in relation to 
medical procedures. 
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1 Introduction
The right to participate was first presented as a legally-binding right 
in article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR)1 to secure (adult) citizens’ participation in the politics 
of a member state.2 Conventionally, this right was not fashioned for 
the benefit of children.3 However, after the adoption of the United 
Nations (UN) Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)4 and 
the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (African 
Children’s Charter),5 it is broadly accepted that children also have a 
right to participate, albeit in different contexts. The analysis in this 
article specifically focuses on the position of children and their ability 
to meaningfully participate in medical decision-making processes 
involving them. 
For African children, the right to participate is contained both in 
article 12 of CRC and in articles 4(2) and 7 of the African Children’s 
Charter.6 As indicated above, children’s right to participate differs from 
adult participation. A child’s right to participate under international 
human rights law may be distinguished from (adult) citizens’ 
participation under, for example, article 25 of ICCPR, in that article 
12 of CRC and articles 4(2) and 7 of the African Children’s Charter 
do not guarantee a specific outcome such as, for example, casting 
a vote, or the free expression of political opinion. Despite the fact 
that international human rights law and medical practice encourage 
patients’ involvement in medical decision-making processes, children 
often are not involved. This is so because decisions of parents and/
or physicians, often argued to be based on the best interests of the 
child, make the opinion of the child redundant.7
To prevent the exclusion of the child in this regard, this article 
adopts a human rights-based approach to children’s participation in 
medical decision-making processes, rooted in CRC and the African 
1 Adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976, 999 UNTS 171.
2 Other examples include arts 21 and 27 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights 1948; art 13 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 1981; 
and art 9 of the African Women’s Protocol.
3 G van Bueren The international law on the rights of the child (1998) 131.
4 Adopted 20 November 1989, entered into force 2 September 1990, 1577 
UNTS 3.
5 Adopted 11 July 1990, entered into force 29 November 1999, CAB/LEG/24.9/49 
(1990).
6 L Ehlers & C Frank ‘Child participation in African context’ in J Sloth-Nielsen (ed) 
Children’s rights in Africa: A legal perspective (2008) 116-122.
7 W Wadlington ‘Medical decision making for and by children: Tensions between 
parent, state, and Child’ (1994) 2 University of Illinois Law Review 311.
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Children’s Charter.8 Under international children’s law, a child’s 
right to participate crucially demands the recognition, respect 
and meaningful engagement of children during decision-making 
processes relating to all matters concerning them, both in private 
and in public. Furthermore, children’s right to participate stresses 
the role of adults in enabling such participation. For instance, adults, 
especially those with the legal responsibility to care for a child, have 
an underlying mandate to continuously assess a child’s evolving 
capacity based on the child’s age, maturity and ability to contribute 
substantively in a decision-making process. The importance of this 
responsibility relates to the fact that the right to participation, unlike 
any other right, requires a child to be meaningfully engaged in a 
decision-making process. It is the meaningful engagement (or lack 
thereof), enabled by the relevant adult(s), which constitutes the 
enjoyment or abjuration of this right. 
Against this background the objective of the article is to argue 
the need in domestic African law to incorporate a specific age 
indicator to protect children’s right to participate in a medical 
decision-making process. The method of the article is to examine 
the three-way partnership between the child, its parent(s) and the 
assigned physician(s), to explain why it is important to identify an 
age indicator against which a child’s general level of maturity can be 
measured under domestic law. This contribution further highlights 
the composition of the three-way partnership and how African states 
have defined and applied age in relation to legislation to ascertain 
the level of a child’s maturity and ability to participate in a medical 
decision-making process. This objective and further discussion 
should be viewed from the perspective that the article ultimately 
suggests that the African human rights system, specifically the 
African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child 
(African Children’s Committee), should adopt an age indicator that 
will further guide all African jurisdictions to properly implement child 
participation in a medical decision-making process. 
The article is divided into five parts. These include the introduction; 
the nexus between the best interests of the child and a child’s right to 
participate in a medical decision-making process; an analysis of the 
power imbalance relating to the three-way partnership in a child’s 
medical decision-making process; an in-depth discussion around the 
8 According to the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, a human 
rights-based research approach must be guided by a systematic understanding 
of the context and the challenges that contribute to a human rights problem. 
See United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner (OHCHR) 
Manual on human rights monitoring, https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/
Publications/Chapter08-44pp.pdf (accessed 8 June 2020).
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interlinked caveats of age and maturity identified under international 
children’s law as crucial to children’s right to participate; and the 
conclusion.
2 Nexus between the best interests of the child and 
child participation
In most cases a medical decision-making process, which concerns 
a child, requires a three-way partnership, involving the child, its 
parent(s) and the assigned physician(s). Notwithstanding the fact 
that children’s participation is essential for the fulfilment of all 
children’s rights, as mentioned above, it is important to recognise its 
practical implications, especially in the context of a medical decision-
making process. This right could, for example, assign children with 
the daunting task of making sense of a complex medical procedure 
involving the child. 
For obvious reasons the three-way partnership usually evokes 
negotiation, compromise and the unwavering necessity to protect 
the best interests of the child. However, as is further discussed in part 
3, parents and physicians involved in this partnership have (clear) 
mandates, while in most cases, and especially during severe and life-
threatening episodes in a child’s life, the role or mandate of the child 
is ill-defined and sometimes non-existent. 
The best interests of the child and child participation are two of 
four9 key aspects of international children’s law identified as guiding 
principles in children’s rights jurisprudence.10 A proper definition 
and method of application of these principles is not clearly provided 
under international children’s law.11 However, according to the 
United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), these principles ‘form 
nothing less than a new attitude toward children [as] they give an 
ethical and ideological dimension to the convention’.12 According 
9 The four general principles also include non-discrimination(equality) and survival 
and development.
10 See, eg, T Morag ‘The principles of the UN Convention on the Rights of the 
Child and their influence on Israeli law’ (2014) 22 Michigan State International 
Law Review 531.
11 L Lundy & B Byrne ‘The four general principles of the United Nations Convention 
on the Rights of the Child: The potential value of the approach in other areas of 
human rights law’ in E Brems et al (eds) Children’s rights law in the global human 
rights landscape (2017) 52.
12 See https://www.unicef.org/armenia/en/stories/four-principles-convention-rig 
hts-child (accessed 8 June 2020).
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to the CRC Committee, to underpin the protection of a particular 
child’s right a combination of these principles is possible.13 
Relating to child participation, the CRC Committee further provides 
that the best interests principle fortifies the functionality of a child’s 
right to participate.14 This means that the decision, or lack thereof, 
to involve a child in a medical decision-making process must be 
motivated by the best interests of the child concerned.15 Rodriguez 
argues that even though the best interests principle is inherently 
dependent on the specific situation of a particular child, the principle 
is ideologically unclear on a method of application.16 For instance, 
as discussed in part 3, there hardly is uniform agreement on who, 
in the three-way partnership, is to make the final decision to include 
or exclude a child from a medical decision-making process. Here, 
the CRC Committee argues that to determine what is in the best 
interests of the child, one should start with the assessment of the 
child’s evolving capacity.17 As argued in parts 3 and 4, the evolving 
capacity of a child usually matures with age.18 Indeed, while it is 
generally accepted that physicians should lead in relation to medical 
questions, it is uncertain as to whether they are better placed to 
permit child participation in relation to, for instance; abortion, 
contraception or sterilisation which may also involve moral, ethical 
and religious considerations. In Gillick v West Norfolk,19 Lord Fraser 
states that parental rights exist for the benefit of the child and the 
child’s best interests requires the physician to advise or to treat the 
child-patient. In Christian Lawyers Association v Minister of Health20 
it was equally established that, in relation to the termination of 
pregnancy, the best interests of the pregnant girl allows for a flexible 
criterion for capacity to consent irrespective of the opinion of the 
girl’s parents.21 Based on the best interests principle, both cases 
arguably advocate an approach which first and foremost supports 
child participation in the three-way partnership. This is because the 
13 CRC Committee General Comment 12 CRC/C/GC/12 (2009), https://digital 
library.un.org/record/671444?ln=en (accessed 10 June 2020).
14 CRC Committee (n 13) paras 70-74.
15 D Archard & M Skivenes ‘Balancing a child’s best interests and a child’s views’ 
(2009) 17 International Journal of Children’s Rights 1.
16 NG Rodriguez ‘Translating ‘best interest’: Child welfare decisions at the US-
México border’ (2016) 39 Political and Legal Anthropology Review 154. See also 
A Skelton ‘Too much of a good thing: Best interests of the child in South African 
jurisprudence’ (2019) 52 De Jure 559-561.
17 CRC Committee General Comment 14 CRC/C/GC/14 (2013), https://www.
refworld.org/docid/51a84b5e4.html para 44 (accessed 26 June 2020).
18 S Varadan ‘The principle of evolving capacities under the UN Convention on the 
Rights of the Child’ (2019) 27 306.
19 Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority & Another (Gillick) [1986] 
1 AC 112, [1985] 3 All ER 402, [1985] 3 WLR 830. 
20 Christian Lawyers Association v Minister of Health 2005 (1) SA 509 (T) (Christian 
Lawyers).
21 Christian Lawyers (n 20) 516D.
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best interests of a child principle recognises a child as a reciprocal 
partner in the partnership and validates the child’s autonomy.22
3 Power imbalances in the three-way partnership 
According to Kennedy, the imbalance of power in medical decision-
making processes is primarily due to the fact that physicians 
often hold information and a skill-set which the child-patient and 
parents do not possess.23 Regarding parents, parental control and 
authority mixed with an emotional and psychological connection 
to the child sometimes exaggerates a protectionist approach to a 
child’s involvement in the partnership.24 Nonetheless, parents have 
an unequivocal right to be involved in this partnership, first and 
foremost as it falls under their responsibility as primary caregivers.25 
For instance, under article 18 of CRC and article 20(1) of the 
African Children’s Charter, parents have the primary responsibility 
for the upbringing and development of the child. Correspondingly, 
as primary caregivers, parents often hold critical health-related 
information about the child that may not be known to the physician. 
Thus, parents cannot, and should not, be excluded from this 
partnership as their role is crucial to the well-being of the child. 
Based on the legal recognition of parents as the primary caregivers 
and the strategic skill-set of physicians, it seems that the challenge 
of balancing powers within this partnership has less to do with the 
child-patient and more to do with parents and physicians.26 In most 
African countries national legislations have defined the parental 
role and related responsibilities in the three-way partnership. For 
instance, in Uganda sections 5 and 6 of the Children’s Act27 confer 
on every parent or guardian the responsibility to care for their child 
and to ensure the child’s well-being. In Ethiopia, article 20(3) of the 
Civil Code confers28 on the guardian the power to submit a child 
22 A Ford ‘Do children have the right to contribute to medical decisions about 
their own care? An analysis of policy and practice in the United Kingdom 
and the United States’ (2017) Health and Human Rights Journal, https://www.
hhrjournal.org/2017/08/do-children-have-the-right-to-contribute-to-medical-
decisions-about-their-own-care-an-analysis-of-policy-and-practice-in-the-
united-kingdom-and-united-states/ (accessed 13 June 2020).
23 I Kennedy Treat me right: Essays in medical law and ethics (1988) 387.
24 See, eg, on parents’ motivations for the participation of their children in medical 
research, A Dar ‘Decision-making about child participation in medical research: 
A relational approach’ (2015) 27 Child and Family Law Quarterly 109.
25 D Archard Children: Rights and childhood (1993) 130.
26 C Himonga & A Cooke ‘A child’s autonomy with special reference to reproductive 
medical decision-making in South African law: Mere illusion or real autonomy’ 
(2007) 15 International Journal of Children’s Rights 323. See also RJ McDougall et 
al ‘Overriding parents’ medical decisions for their children: A systematic review 
of normative literature’ (2013) 40 Journal of Medical Ethics 448.
27 Children Act, Cap 59 (amended) of 2016.
28 Civil Code Proclamation 165/1960.
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to a medical examination or treatment, beneficial to their health. 
Similarly, articles 257(1) and (2) of the Revised Family Code of 
Ethiopia29 provides that the guardian shall watch over the health of 
the minor and shall take the necessary measures for the recovery of 
the minor in case of sickness. 
In other African countries, such as Tanzania, parents have a 
shared responsibility to take care and ensure the protection of a 
child through the provision of medical care.30 In Egypt, parental 
involvement is recognised especially in cases of organ transplants. 
Section 116 of its Child Law31 warns that anyone who fails to recognise 
parental consent, especially with regard to organ transplants, shall 
be punished by imprisonment.32 In Nigeria, section 39(c)(i) of the 
Code of Medical Ethics provides an interesting twist both to parental 
involvement and the role of a child in the three-way partnership. It 
provides, inter alia, that children aged between 16 and 18
have a statutory right of their own to consent to procedures and this 
takes precedence over parental objections, but does not invalidate 
the right of others to consent on their behalf. However, where the 
child of this age group objects and parental consent is obtained in 
an emergency situation, appropriate treatment or procedure can be 
given.33
The Nigerian Code of Medical Ethics makes crucial a point: Where 
a child is able to substantively and logically participate and consent 
to a medical process, parental opinion can be overridden.34 As is 
further analysed in part 4, the issue of age is vital to demarcate the 
role of the child in the three-way partnership. For example, in Gillick, 
Mrs Gillick’s objection to the provision of contraceptives to her 
daughters, without her prior knowledge and consent, was overruled 
by the Court. Lord Fraser concluded that it would be ‘verging on the 
absurd to suggest that a girl or boy aged fifteen could not effectively 
consent, for example to have a medical examination of some trivial 
injury to his [or her] body or even to have a broken arm set’.35 He 
went on to conclude:36
29 The Revised Family Code Proclamation 213/2000 (Revised Family Code).
30 See, generally, secs 8 & 16 of the Law of the Child Act 21 of 2009 consolidating 
all the laws relating to children.
31 Child Law 12 of 1996 (amended by Law 126) of 2008.
32 According to sec 116 of the Child Law (n 31) anyone who fails to recognise 
parental consent, especially in the case of an organ transplant, shall be punished 
by imprisonment.
33 The Code of Medical Ethics of 2004 of Nigeria.
34 See also L Krappmann ‘The weight of the child’s view (article 12 of the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child)’ (2010) 18 International Journal of Children’s Rights 
502.
35 Gillick (n 19) 169.
36 Gillick 405.
(2020) 20 AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW JOURNAL674
The consent of the parents should normally be asked, but they may not 
be immediately available. Provided the patient, whether a boy or girl, 
is capable of understanding what is proposed, and of expressing his or 
her own wishes, I see no good reason for holding that he or she lacks 
the capacity to express them validly and effectively and to authorise 
the medical man to make the examination or give the treatment which 
he wishes.
Therefore, parental opinion is prioritised and only set aside if it is not 
in the child’s best interests. Consequently, as discussed further below, 
the rights of a child and their parents continue to require constant 
safeguarding and balancing. As stated above, the contestations 
that take place within the three-way partnership seldom is between 
the child and the physician, but rather between the parents and 
the physician, where parents may challenge the medical approach 
or dominate the child-patient for personal, cultural or religious 
reasons.37 
As mentioned in the introduction, unlike the roles of parents and 
physicians, a child’s role in the partnership is further weakened by 
the fact that international children’s law does not provide contents 
to the role of the child-patient in medical decision-making processes. 
For example, article 5 of CRC simply guarantees the exercise of the 
child’s right, including the right to self-determination, according to 
their evolving capacity. In this regard it directs adults (in the three-
way partnership: parents and physicians) to provide appropriate 
direction and guidance in the exercise of their rights in accordance 
with a child’s evolving capacity. Therefore, besides the fact that it is 
the child’s health and a child has an unequivocal right to participate 
in all matters concerning their health, international children’s law is 
implicitly and explicitly silent on the actual role of child-patients in 
the three-way partnership. 
The undermined position of the child-patient in this partnership 
is further exacerbated by the child’s age and maturity. The scope of 
a child’s right to participate under CRC and the African Children’s 
Charter reflect these limitations. Consequently, it grants powers to 
states and parents to give due weight to a child’s views, based on the 
child’s age and maturity. Thus, where a child expresses an opinion, the 
substance of such an opinion should be vetted against the impact it 
may or may not have on the health or well-being of the child-patient. 
For example, in the CRC Committee’s Concluding Observations on 
37 JMT Labuschagne et al ‘Parental rights to participate in a child’s personality 
development and its religious and moral upbringing and the child’s right to 
freedom of choice: Observations on the field of tension caused by the irrational 
in a human rights dispensation’ (2004) 25 Obiter 41 48-51.
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Liberia, the Committee expresses that it is ‘concerned that as a result 
of prevailing traditional attitudes, children are often not consulted 
about decisions affecting them … in the family’.38 In this regard the 
CRC Committee recommends that Liberia strengthen its efforts to 
ensure that children have the right to express their views, ‘in the 
family … and [in] other institutions and bodies as well as in society 
at large’.39
Technically, from the outset, adults’ judgment of a child’s 
competence is pre-conceived even before consultations begin.40 
Kruger affirms that children’s presumed lack of developmental 
maturity makes them uniquely vulnerable in a medical decision-
making process.41 However, a child’s right to participate in a medical 
decision-making process tempers the powers given to parents and 
physicians under international children’s law, as the latter do not, 
separately and/or jointly, have the legal authority over a child’s 
health without acting with due diligence. According to Freeman, 
this due diligence should extend to respecting the scope of the best 
interests of the child and child participation, the roles of the parties 
in the three-way partnership and specifically the responsibilities of 
parents in a medical decision-making process.42 As discussed in part 
2, parents have an unequivocal obligation to act in the best interests 
of a child at all times. However, the absence of demonstrated and 
consistent protection of the best interests of the child will bring 
parental involvement and their decision-making capacity into 
question.43 
Nevertheless, within international children’s law, the demand 
of paramountcy of the best interests of a child remains unclear. In 
De Reuck v Director of Public Prosecutions, for instance, the South 
African Constitutional Court held that ‘paramount consideration’ in 
38 CRC Committee Concluding Observations: Liberia, 1 July 2004, CRC/C/15/
Add.236, https://www.refworld.org/docid/42d28f214.html para 28 (accessed 
14 June 2020).
39 CRC Committee (n 38) para 29.
40 See, eg, research conducted in Ireland, I Coyne et al ‘Giving children a voice: 
Investigation of children’s experiences of participation in consultation and 
decision-making in Irish hospitals’ (2006), http://www.dcya.gov.ie/documents/
research/Giving_Children_a_Voice.pdf (accessed 2 May 2019).
41 H Kruger ‘The protection of children’s right to self-determination in South 
African law with specific reference to medical treatment and operations’ 2018 
(21) Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 2.
42 M Freeman ‘Rethinking Gillick’ (2005)13 International Journal of Children’s Rights 
201.
43 See, eg, the decision in P v M (590/2014) [2017] ZAECPEHC 14 (14 February 
2017) decided in the High Court of South Africa (Eastern Cape Local Division, 
Port Elizabeth) where Chetty J granted sole custody of a child from a divorced 
marriage to the applicant because the respondent has a poor record of acting in 
the best interests of the child concerned. 
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section 28(2) of the South African Constitution of 199644 does not 
automatically mean that a child’s best interests can never be limited 
by other rights.45 Accordingly, the weight of the understanding 
and application of a child’s best interests should be governed by a 
thorough, candid and contextual analysis. Eekelaar suggests that a 
thorough judgment of what is best for a child depends on a case-
by-case analysis.46 He warns that ‘if the best solution to the issue 
in question is considered to have a detrimental effect on a child’s 
interest, it may need to be modified or abandoned … the focus 
remains finding what is best for the child’.47 
Therefore, even though international children’s law insists on the 
importance of meaningfully involving children in medical decision-
making processes, parents and physicians have the ultimate decision-
making power to ascertain whether it is in the best interests of a 
child to be included or excluded from the process.48 However, no 
parental or physician’s right or responsibility will have any substance 
or meaning if the medical decision arrived at is not in the best 
interests of the child.49 A child’s welfare must be the ambit within 
which any decision relating to a child is made. A medical decision is 
a crucial process in a child’s life, which could either ensure continuity 
of a child’s development or possibly end it. Hence, even though 
the child-patient might not make any substantive contribution to 
the process, it is crucial that as a minimum, there is some form of 
conversation within the partnership to permeate some level of access 
to information that would lead to an informed consent by the child 
to a preferred medical procedure. However, the question remains 
as to whether an equal partnership in medical decision-making 
processes involving children is at all times feasible. 
As briefly mentioned above, from the outset there is an existing 
imbalance in the power structure between the physician, parent(s) 
and the child-patient. From a practical perspective this imbalance is 
manifested through a child’s physical and psychological vulnerability 
which also affects their ability to make choices that are more 
progressive than those of adults. In a medical context, as mentioned, 
44 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (Constitution).
45 De Reuck v Director of Public Prosecutions 2003 (3) SA 389 (W).
46 J Eekelaar ‘The role of the best interests principle in decisions affecting children 
and decisions about children’ (2015) 23 International Journal of Children’s Rights 
3.
47 Eekelaar (n 46) 5.
48 AJ Kleinfeld ‘The balance of power among infants, their parents and the state’ 
(1970) 4 Family Law Quarterly 63; see also SJ Baskin ‘State intrusion into family 
affairs: Justifications and limitations’ (1974) 26 Stanford Law Review 1383.
49 See, eg, Kaiser v Chambers 1969 (4) SA 224 (C) 228G, where the Court referred 
to the best interests of the child as a ‘golden thread which runs through the 
whole fabric of our [South African] law relating to children’.
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physicians hold technical information and skills and as such are vested 
with specific powers. Equally, from a natural and legal perspective, 
parents have an unmatched responsibility to provide primary care. 
Conversely, the child has no specific role apart from being the 
patient while having a right to participate in all decisions relating to 
its health. 
In Castell v De Greeff50 the Western Cape High Court provided 
content to the concept of a child’s participation in the three-way 
partnership through the lens of a patient-focused approach. This 
method recognised the child’s fundamental rights of autonomy and 
self-determination.51 In this case, the Court held that physicians have 
a legal obligation to obtain a patient’s informed consent before any 
medical intervention.52 Even though this is the standard procedure, 
the case of children is different as it introduces limitations to this 
legal requirement to consent during a medical decision-making 
process due to the perceived immaturity of a child and the imposing 
presence of parents and physicians. 
Notwithstanding the necessary parental presence and opinion, 
the Nigerian Court of Appeal in Esanubor v Faweya53 held that where 
parental opinion regarding a child’s health is not in the best interests 
of the child, it should be set aside by the medical doctor or a higher 
authority.54 This case is crucial to understanding the complexity of the 
power imbalance that exists in the three-way partnership. Succinctly, 
the Court in Esanubor establishes that even though parents enjoy vast 
powers in the upbringing of their child, the best interests of the child 
trumps such authority. Furthermore, in a medical decision-making 
process a physician has the power to override parental opinion where 
it interferes with a child’s best interests. Related to this, the following 
part presents an analysis of the two main delineating factors that 
constrain a child’s role in the three-way partnership: a child’s age 
and their maturity.
4 A child’s age and maturity
The aspect of ‘age’ is central in children’s rights jurisprudence. Under 
international children’s law a ‘child’ is defined as anyone below the 
age of 18 years. As a result, every child is entitled to all the rights 
in CRC and the African Children’s Charter. Under certain rights, for 
50 Castell v De Greeff 1994 (4) SA 408 (C).
51 Castell v De Greeff (n 50) 425-426.
52 As above.
53 Esanubor v Faweya [2009] All FWLR (Pt 478) (CA) (Esanubor).
54 Esanubor (n 53) para 380.
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instance, a child’s right to be protected from economic exploitation, 
both instruments oblige state parties to provide for a minimum age 
for admission to employment.55
Under a child’s right to participate none of the instruments 
explicitly mandates state parties to provide for a minimum age for 
admission into a decision-making process on matters concerning the 
child. Instead, the instruments provide ‘age’ and ‘maturity’ as ‘tools’ 
to enable the state to give appropriate due weight to a child’s views.56 
As discussed further in part 4.1, the aspects of age and maturity are 
different but interlinked concepts that are analysed as a combined 
caveat to a child’s right to participate. As requirements, guiding 
state party and/or parental or adult interactions with children, 
‘age’ and ‘maturity’ to date have been recognised as distinguished 
features that determine the weight given to a child’s opinion on their 
health.57 Broadly, this makes sense because not every child might be 
able to express an immediate opinion in a medical decision-making 
process. However, at a later stage the child may have an opinion and 
may wish to express it. As is argued below in part 4.1, the absence 
of an age indicator, as a starting point when ascertaining children’s 
maturity and ability to participate in the partnership, has contributed 
to limiting children’s enjoyment of their right to be involved in 
medical decision-making processes.
4.1 The importance of an age indicator
Except for CRC and the African Children’s Charter, there is no other 
binding international human rights instruments with a proliferation 
of joint parental and state obligations. Both instruments assign 
parents and state parties with separate and joint duties to safeguard 
the effective protection of certain children’s rights depending on the 
age of the child.58 Also, as indicated above, both instruments stipulate 
that a child is any person below the age of 18 years. However, CRC 
indicates an exception: If the age of majority under the law applicable 
55 See art 15 of the African Children’s Charter and art 32 of CRC.
56 Other caveats contained in a child’s right to participate include a child’s ability 
to form an opinion, a child’s ability to communicate their opinion freely and the 
due weight criterion. For further details on these caveats, see A Parkes Children 
and international human rights law: The right of the child to be heard (2013) 1.
57 See, generally, CRC Committee General Comment 12 The right of the child to be 
heard (2009) UN Doc CRC/C/GC/12 para 12.
58 See, eg, art 3 of CRC and art 4(1) of the African Children’s Charter according to 
which the state and parents are obliged to ensure that the best interests of the 
child is the primary consideration in all actions concerning the child.
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to the child is attained earlier that age will indicate the threshold.59 
The African Children’s Charter contains no such exception.60 
Notwithstanding the indication of the age of 18 as the threshold 
to adulthood in international children’s law, the definition of a child 
differs across different legal disciplines. For instance, in criminal 
matters the category of punishment a child offender receives depends 
on the age of the child. In Centre for Child Law v Minister for Justice 
& Constitutional Development61 the applicant brought an application 
to challenge the constitutionality of the Criminal Law Amendment 
Act62 providing the minimum sentence provision for children 16 and 
17 years old at the time of the offence. Section 28 of the South 
African Constitution defines a child as anyone below the age of 18. 
South Africa furthermore is a state party to CRC and the African 
Children’s Charter. Nevertheless, the Constitutional Court held that 
‘the minimum sentencing legislation, in so far, as it is applicable 
to children who are 16 and 17 years old is not inconsistent with 
the Constitution’.63 Generally, across Africa there are varied ages of 
responsibility that are lower than the identified age of 18 stipulated 
in CRC and the African Children’s Charter.64 These inconsistencies 
reflect a seemingly irreconcilable clash between international 
children’s law and domestic law.  
As discussed in part 4, a child’s right to participate does not identify 
a compulsory age limit that will mandate a child’s involvement 
in a decision-making process. However, the state and parents are 
required to measure a child’s opinion based on the child’s age and 
maturity. As discussed further in part 4.2, this article argues that a 
child’s age and not a child’s maturity should be the deciding factor 
whether or not to involve a child in a medical decision-making 
process concerning the child. This is because striking a balance 
between a child’s mental capacity and right to be involved in the 
three-way partnership, in respect of ascertaining the developmental 
level at which a child gains sufficient competence to participate in a 
59 Art 1 CRC.
60 For more details on the differences between these instruments, see D Chirwa 
‘The merits and demerits of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of 
the Child’ (2002) 10 International Journal of Children’s Rights 157; D Olowu 
‘Protecting children’s rights in Africa: A critique of the African Charter on the 
Rights and Welfare of the Child’ (2002) 10 International Journal of Children’s 
Rights 127. 
61 Centre for Child Law v Minister of Justice & Constitutional Development 2009 (6) SA 
632 (CC).
62 Criminal Law (Sentencing) Amendment Act 38 of 2007.
63 Centre for Child Law (n 61) 126.
64 See, eg, Child Rights International Network (CRIN) ‘Minimum ages of criminal 
responsibility in Africa’, https://archive.crin.org/en/home/ages/Africa.html 
(accessed 14 June 2020).
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medical decision-making process, is a complex exercise. As is further 
argued below, an age indicator could provide a realistic and time-
friendly measure for a child to participate meaningfully in a medical 
decision-making process.65 The validity of an age indicator ostensibly 
is limited in context as, for practical reasons, a child’s cognitive ability 
to withstand pressure in most cases matures with age. 
Therefore, the institution of an age indicator to presume maturity 
and consequently decisional competence strengthens a child’s right 
to participate. As pointed out in the introduction, the absence of 
an indication of when a child could meaningfully participate in a 
medical decision-making process is a significant gap in international 
children’s law. The CRC Committee through its General Comment 
12 has welcomed the introduction of ‘age’ as a basic indicator 
to ascertain children’s maturity and level of competence to, for 
example, participate in a medical decision-making process.66 As 
discussed further under 4.2, the Committee’s position,67 understood 
in conjunction with article 5 of CRC,68 arguably endorses a flexible 
approach that recognises a child’s evolving capacities and rejects 
arbitrary age restrictions.69 Consequently, where a younger child, 
that is, a child who falls below the age indicator, demonstrates the 
mental capacity to express an informed view on their health-related 
treatment, due weight should be given to such views regardless of 
the child’s age.70  
4.2 African examples of the implications of an age indicator 
As highlighted throughout this article, the question of whether a 
child is competent to participate in a medical decision-making 
process is contentious. One of the contestations specifically refers to 
65 CRIN (n 64) para 102.
66 As above.
67 See General Comment 12 para 102, where the Committee ‘welcomes the 
introduction in some countries of a fixed age at which the right to consent 
transfers to the child, and encourages states parties to give consideration 
to the introduction of such legislation. Thus, children above that age have 
an entitlement to give consent without the requirement for any individual 
professional assessment of capacity after consultation with an independent and 
competent expert. However, the Committee strongly recommends that states 
parties ensure that, where a younger child can demonstrate capacity to express 
an informed view on her or his treatment, this view is given due weight.’
68 This article deals with parental guidance and the child’s evolving capacities. 
It introduces the notion that a child should be allowed to participate in all 
matters concerning the child when the child acquires that ability to do so. It 
further mandates state parties to consider a child’s level of development when 
instituting a minimum age of participation on particular issues. 
69 CRIN ‘Age is arbitrary: Setting minimum ages’ 21, https://www.crin.org/en/
library/publications/age-arbitrary-discussion-paper-setting-minimum-ages 
(accessed 8 April 2019).
70 As above.
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the question of whether the decision to involve a child in the three-
way partnership should be determined by the child’s age, maturity 
or both. This article argues that it makes sense to consider both 
but ‘age’ should trump ‘maturity’ at the point of deciding whether 
or not to include a child in the partnership. The reason why it is 
important to consider age and not maturity at the point of involving 
a child in the partnership is because a child’s ability to meaningfully 
engage in a decision-making process often is a function of intellectual 
reach that matures with age. Also, because the ability to ascertain a 
child’s intellectual reach often requires special skills and considerable 
time, the aspect of age is critical.71 An age indicator, unlike a child’s 
maturity, could provide a basic and an immediate response to the 
legal obligation to include or the practical challenge to exclude a 
child-patient from a medical decision-making process.72 
As argued above, the concept of child participation as it is 
prescribed under international children’s law obliges physicians 
and parents to consider a child-patient competent to participate 
meaningfully in the three-way partnership. However, practically this 
is not achievable for several reasons.73 Therefore, there is an urgent 
need to further delineate the concept of child participation under 
international children’s law by adding a minimum age to allow 
physicians and parents to anticipate a child’s competence. This is 
crucial as it will provide a fair and judicious starting point to ascertain 
a child’s maturity. 
Before considering the reasons for introducing such an age 
indicator, as is further discussed in part 4.3 below, and as a point of 
departure for such an initiative it is worth considering how different 
African jurisdictions have regulated the age of child participation 
in medical decision-making processes. Thus, to create a framework 
within which to understand the ‘minimum age’ requirement, some 
contrasting, not always uniform, examples of African domestic 
regulations are set out below. 
71 E Ochaita & MA Espinosa ‘Children’s participation in family and school life: A 
psychological and developmental approach’ (1997) 5 International Journal of 
Children’s Rights 279 284-88.
72 For an in-depth analysis of the presumptive competence of child, see H Rodham 
‘Children under the law’ (1974) 9 Harvard Educational Review 22.
73 Some of these reasons could include a child’s lack of sufficient competence, 
negative parental influence and severe medical conditions. For further details on 
these reasons and more, see P Grootens-Wiegers et al ‘Medical decision-making 
in children and adolescents: Developmental and neuroscientific aspects’ (2017) 
17 BMC Pediatrics 2.
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In South Africa section 129(2)(3) of chapter 7, part 3 of the 
Children’s Act74 confers on children over the age of 12 years the right 
to participate in medical decision-making processes relating to the 
child.75 However, a child younger than 12 is allowed to participate 
if the child is of sufficient maturity and has the mental capacity 
to understand the benefits, risks, social and other implications of 
the treatment required.76 Therefore, section 129(2)(3) does not 
permanently eliminate a child under the age of 12 as a competent 
participant. Rather, it confirms the participation of all children of 
a certain age in the three-way partnership. However, the role of 
the child could be affected if the child fails to display the level of 
mental capacity during a participatory process. If the child is not 
mature enough to make a justiciable contribution, the Children’s 
Act introduces parents and physicians as competent to make the 
relevant decisions77 guided by the best interests of the child.78 
It is worth noting that according to the Children’s Act, the 
responsibilities of parents and physicians are only activated when 
the child’s contribution is not in their best interests. Therefore, even 
though there is an age indicator, a child’s evolving capacity trumps 
the age indicator when a child displays sufficient aptitude even when 
the child is below the age of 12 years.79 According to Appelbaum, 
this is a correct clinical position because a certain level of mental 
competence is needed to balance a child’s autonomy with the legal 
requirement to protect a child’s right to participate in a medical 
decision-making process.80 
In Mauritania the age limit of 12 is also recognised in accordance 
with the principles of Maliki Muslim law.81 However, unlike in South 
Africa, the age limit of 12 is not as an absolute primary determinant 
of a child’s mental competence. In Mauritania the age limitation 
74 Children’s Act 38 of 2005 (Children’s Act).
75 Children’s Act (n 74) ch 7 part 3 sec 129(2)(a). See also DJ McQuoid-Mason 
‘Can children aged 12 years or more refuse lifesaving treatment without consent 
or assistance from anyone else?’ (2014) 104 South African Medical Journal 466-
467.
76 Children’s Act (n 74) ch 7 part 3 sec 129(2)(a).
77 Children’s Act (n 74) sec 129(4)(a)(b).
78 See ch 2 of the Act.
79 See, eg, sec 129(1) of the Children’s Act, referring to sec 5(1) of the Choice on 
Termination of Pregnancy Act, which confers the right of consent to an abortion 
on every girl child (irrespective of age) when she has the mental capacity to do 
so.
80 PS Appelbaum ‘Clinical practice. Assessment of patients’ competence to consent 
to treatment’ (2007) 357 The New England Journal of Medicine 1834.
81 See, eg, art 15 of the Code of Obligations and Contracts which stipulates that 
‘[a]ny person in possession of his mental faculties and not having been forbidden 
so to do is fully capable of exercising his civil rights’. See also CRC Committee on 
the CRC Consideration of reports submitted by States Parties under article 44 of 
the Convention: Mauritania UN Doc CRC/C/8/Add.42 paras 18-29 & 47-48.
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considers children under the age of 12 as absolutely incapable, and 
children from 12 and above as persons with limited mental capacity.82 
However, not all African states identify the age of 12 as a threshold 
for maturity. For example, in Tunisia article 42 of the Code for the 
Protection of the Child83 sets the age indicator at the age of 13.84 
In Ethiopia85 and Eswatini86 children are not considered to have 
sufficient mental competence at any stage of their development. In 
article 7 of the Revised Family Code of Ethiopia87 a minor is defined 
as anyone below 18. Moreover, article 257(2) of the Revised Family 
Code states that ‘[i]n case of sickness of the minor, the guardian shall 
take the necessary measures for his recovery’.88 Similarly, in Eswatini 
the provisions of the Mental Health Order89 recognises a child as 
anyone below 18 years. However, the Mental Health Order provides 
that persons under the age of 21 require parental consent to access 
medical services.90 
In Namibia a different approach to child participation has been 
developed. The Child Care and Protection Act91 holds that ‘every child 
that is of an age, maturity and stage of development as to be able to 
participate in any matter concerning that child’ should be allowed 
to participate. The provision proceeds to add that the child must be 
able to participate in ‘an appropriate way’. Based on the detailed 
analysis of the context of child participation by the CRC Committee, 
82 CRC Committee (n 81) para 19. This provision is supplemented by art 164 of 
the Personal Status Code which provides that ‘[a] person who reaches the age 
of discernment before reaching the age of majority does not enjoy full legal 
capacity’.
83 Code de La Protection de L’enfant Loi n° 95-92 du 9 Novembre 1995 (Code for 
the Protection of the Child).
84 See, generally, art 42 which states: ‘Le délégué à la protection de l’enfance doit 
obligatoirement informer les parents et l’enfant âgé de 13 ans de leur droit 
de refuser la mesure proposée. Dans le cas où aucun accord n’est établi dans 
un délai de vingt jours à partir du moment où le délégué à la protection de 
l’enfance s’est saisi du cas, le dossier est soumis au juge de la famille. Il en est 
ainsi dans le cas où l’accord est résilié par l’enfant ou par ses parents ou par celui 
qui en a la charge.’ For details, see Code de La Protection de L’enfant (n 83), 
relative à la publication du code de la protection de l’enfant.
85 See, eg, art 215 of the Revised Family Code of 2002 which states that ‘[a] minor 
is a person of either sex who has not attained the full age of eighteen years’.
86 The Age of Majority Act (1853) stipulates the age of majority to be 21 years. 
See also CRC Committee Initial Report of States Parties Due in 1997, Swaziland 
(2006) CRC/C/SWZ/1, https://www.refworld.org/docid/45377ec90.html para 
66 (accessed 26 June 2020).
87 Revised Family Code (n 29).
88 See, generally, The Revised Family Code of 2000, http://www.refworld.org/
pdfid/4c0ccc052.pdf (accessed 20 April 2020). See also CRC Committee 
Consideration of reports submitted by States Parties under Article 44 of the 
Convention: Ethiopia UN Doc CRC/C/129/Add.8 para 60.
89 Public Health Order: The King’s Order-in-Council of 20/1978 (Mental Health 
Order).
90 CRC Committee Consideration of reports submitted by States Parties under 
Article 44 of the Convention: Swaziland (n 86) para 77.
91 Child Care and Protection Act 3 of 2015 (Child Care and Protection Act).
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the addition of the latter condition arguably is counterproductive to 
the participation of the child and the best interests of the child as it 
further compounds a child’s position in the three-way partnership 
in two distinct ways. First, it could be interpreted to require that 
a child must be able to articulate its opinion at the same level as 
adults. Second, it could also be interpreted to require that a child 
must be able to fully understand the subject matter of the decision-
making process.92 Construed in this way, this arguably creates a high 
threshold for child participation.
4.3 Reasons for introducing an age indicator to determine 
maturity in medical decision-making processes
The importance of introducing an age indictor in domestic law, as 
a primary determinant of a child’s maturity and mental competence 
to participate in a medical decision-making process, cannot be 
overstated. According to the CRC Committee, it indeed is a welcome 
idea.93 Moreover, as argued throughout this article, the aspect of 
‘age’ is more important in the implementation of children’s right 
to participate in medical decision-making processes than it is in 
any other decision-making processes. This is so because health-
related decisions are personal and an erroneous decision could 
lead to bodily harm or death. The CRC Committee has reaffirmed 
the importance of a comprehensive understanding of the context 
of children’s right to participate in a medical decision-making 
process by stating that before parents give their consent, children of 
sufficient maturity should be given a chance to express their views 
freely and their views should be given due weight.94 In this regard, 
Kassan and Mahery suggest that a child-patient should be allowed to 
participate in a medical decision-making process if they comply with 
two requirements, namely, age and maturity.95  
The suggestion made in this article, that African jurisdictions 
that do not include an age reference in terms of medical decision-
making processes such as in South Africa and Mauritania, should 
be amended to include a reference to a fixed age that will allow a 
child to be involved in the three-way partnership formed around a 
92 CRC Committee General Comment 12 (n 57). See also K Herbots & J Put ‘The 
participation disc: A concept analyses of [a] child [’s right to] participation’ 
(2015) 23 International Journal of Children’s Rights 154.
93 CRC Committee (n 67).
94 CRC Committee General Comment 4 Adolescent health and development in the 
context of the Convention on the Rights of the Child UN Doc CRC/GC/2003/4 
para 32.
95 D Kassan & P Mahery ‘Special child protective measures in the Children’s Act’ in 
T Boezaart (ed) Child Law in South Africa 208-209.
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medical decision-making process, may be justified based on three 
main considerations.
The first is the widespread domestication of international children’s 
rights and the increasing development of domestic children’s rights 
protection programmes on the continent. This arguably is related 
to the widespread acceptance and recognition of children as right 
bearers on the continent. Except for the Saharawi Arab Democratic 
Republic, all AU states are parties to CRC, and 49 out of these 54 
states have also ratified the African Children’s Charter. 
Second, the need for an age indicator to safeguard a child’s right 
to participate in a medical decision-making process specifically relates 
to the fact that it is different from other participatory processes.96 
Also, according to Grootens-Wiegers, a medical decision-making 
process requires adequate mental competence and the maturity to 
take responsibility for the decision made.97 However, the content 
of child participation as stipulated in article 12 of CRC and articles 
4(2) and 7 of the African Children’s Charter only requires a child to 
express a view and not for the child to take responsibility for the 
decision made. It is the responsibility of parents and the physician 
in the three-way partnership to give due weight to the views of the 
child and to take responsibility for the final decision. As discussed in 
parts 4 1 and 4 2, an age indicator is necessary in the partnership to 
make it compulsory for a child of a certain age to express a view in a 
medical decision-making process. 
Third, and related to the aforementioned considerations, is 
the impact of the increasing global recognition of a child, as an 
autonomous person and the growing re-ordering of parent-child 
relationship.98 In S v M99 Sachs J held that the ultimate responsibility 
of parents  
is to ensure that [they] serve as the most immediate moral exemplars 
for their offspring. Their responsibility is not just to be with their 
children and look after their daily needs. It is certainly not simply to 
secure money to buy the accoutrements of the consumer society, such 
as cell phones and expensive shoes. It is to show their children how to 
96 Eg, decision-making processes around a child’s education, clothing and food 
evoke minimal levels of responsibility as compared to a medical decision-making 
process that could result in a permanent disability or death if not well thought 
out.   
97 Grootens-Wiegers (n 73) 2.
98 For more on the parent-child relationship, see A Twum-Danso ‘Reciprocity, 
respect and responsibility: The 3Rs underlying parent-child relationships in 
Ghana and the implications for children’s rights’ (2009) 17 International Journal 
of Children’s Rights 415.
99 S v M (Centre for Child Law as Amicus Curiae) 2008 (3) SA 232 (CC).
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look problems in the eye. It is to provide them with guidance on how 
to deal with setbacks and make difficult decisions. Children have a 
need and a right to learn from their primary caregivers that individuals 
make moral choices for which they can be held accountable.100
What is more, a child’s right to participate recognises that there 
are certain aspects of a child’s private life and person that need 
protection. Some of these aspects include a child’s bodily integrity, 
respect, freedom and autonomy. It is the combination of these unique 
features of a child’s right to participation that influenced Freeman to 
regard this right as the kingpin of children’s rights protection.101 In 
other words, the right to participation breathes life into and holds 
the other rights in CRC and the African Children’s Charter together 
as it ensures a child’s autonomy and ability to contribute to the 
enjoyment of all rights. 
5 Conclusion
As technology and other sophisticated means of treatment are 
increasingly introduced into the medical field, medical decision-
making becomes more complicated to explain and understand. 
As a result, physicians and parents are progressively faced with 
the difficult task of ascertaining whether or not to involve a child-
patient in a medical decision-making process. As in most legal 
child protection schemes in Africa, when it is established that it is 
impossible for a child-patient to participate, parents and physicians 
are allowed to trump a child’s right to participate and make decisions 
guided by the best interests of the child. Therefore, as argued in this 
article, the reference exclusively to the ‘best interests’ or to ‘age’ 
and/or ‘maturity’, without further clarifications or parameters, is 
largely insufficient in establishing and protecting a child in a medical 
decision-making process. 
Children’s right to participate has been lauded as an empowerment 
right. However, the inclusion of caveats in international children’s law, 
such as age and maturity, has both complicated its implementation 
and opened up the door for further clarifications and protection under 
domestic law. Moreover, the inclusion of claw-backs in international 
children’s law, such as the reference to the views of the child being 
given ‘due weight’, weakens the central intention of the protection 
of this right as it applies to children. 
100 S v M (n 99) para 134.
101 M Freeman ‘The importance of a children’s rights perspective in litigation’ 
(1996) 2 Butterworths Family Law Journal 84.
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As has been argued in this article, one of the obvious ways to 
ascertain a child’s involvement in a medical decision is through 
an evaluation of the child’s level of development and evolving 
capacity. However, since this approach generally is laborious and 
time consuming, the article has argued that the institution of an 
age indicator in domestic African law as the minimum threshold 
to involve a child in a medical decision-making process should be 
encouraged. 
